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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KAREN ANDERSON STUCKI, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
FRANKLIN S. STUCKI, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 14563 
APPELLANTS BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case arose on a divorce, Motion for Modification 
of Interlocutory Decree of Divorce and the failure of the Court 
to grant same. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On 22 May, 1973, the District Court of Iron County, 
Utah, granted a divorce between the parties. There were no 
children to consider. The parties had been married on the 
15th of May, 1965. While the defendant had several children 
from the issue of a former marriage, all had attained their 
majority at the time of divorce. The defendant was steadily 
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employed at the LLme of divorce with the Utah State Department 
*f Employment Security. The plaintiff had had failing health 
;•-r Lor to tl le marrI age
 9 di lri i ig til le n la rr 1 age and at tl le ti me of 
the divorce. There was a counterclaim of the defendant. Each 
of the parties was represented at the time df divorce and . ^  
'.'-:'*..'"• • v »i>- hpir position. Al imony was awarded 
>• n ;UM <>! $300.00 per mon» li unl. i. L Lin sum of $12,000 Ju> 
had been paid, wi i n ? 1 • *• *xj»r» :--, n^^ ;u,-i/;c thai s;v>\i*- *.is i^ ~:* 
of all property settlements and iill other items, with except inn 
of attorney fees, court costs and plaintiff's personal be-
] ongi i lgs . Tl: le Decree was dated tl le 21 si: of June, 1973, and 
filed thereafter. The Findings of Fact contained a finding 
in paragraph 4 Lhal plainLiU ^a>li:f:< irom heart a i 1 mei it of" 
a considerable extent, and ii is obvious to ^ he Court that 
her health is impaired. *n addition, there Is a finding that 
the defendant, in adu ii - <>< ;• ;>• in>; '-;U\'?dI i y employed, received 
a monthly check from the Veterans Administration as a pension. 
There is an express finding that the plaintiff should be 
awarded alimony in I.lie snin of" $300.00 per mohth and terminated 
when $12,000.0(1 has been paid* A Motion for Modification of 
Interlocutory Decree of Divorce claiming a change in circum-
stances of Lhe plaintiff, to-wit, further deterioration of 
her healthy arid In addition, continued illness of the plain-
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tiff's father and his death after a long-term terminal illness, 
the continued illness of the plaintiff's mother, and that the 
improbability of inheriting anything from the plaintiff's 
father as a result of the long-term illness had become 
non-existent* This was dated the 13th day of February, 1976, 
and was filed prior to the time that the $300.00 per month 
payments terminated upon the payment of $12,000.00, and was 
duly filed on or about the 17th day of February, 1976, or 
shortly thereafter. That the Court denied same, and on a 
Motion of Reconsideration on or about the 18th of March, 
1976, a judgment without a hearing on or about the 19th of 
March, 1976, which was filed the 24th of March, 1976. A 
second Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration 
of Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Interlocutory 
Decree of Divorce was dated the 1st of April, 1976, and was 
filed thereafter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The reversal of the Judgment dated the 19th day of 
March, 1976, denying the Motion for Modification of Inter-
locutory Decree of Divorce and reversal of the Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Modification of Interlocutory Decree of Divorce• 
~4-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As indicated above, this arose out of an earlier 
Decree of Divorce* At the time of divorce, the defendant 
was making $13,973.08 a year or $750.00 a month take home 
pay, and $43.40 per month from the Veterans Administration 
on a pension. The plaintiff had been sick f0r many years 
and had been treated by Dr. R. G. Williams, £ local 
physician, plaintiff being a heart patient. Treatment had 
been in excess of 20 years at the time of diyorce. There 
had been heart surgery as a child, approximately 5 years of 
age. Plaintiff had been advised before marriage not to have 
any children because of constitutional weakness and at that 
time her employment was most limited, although at that time 
she was employable for a few hours a day on properly oriented 
jobs. At the time of the Motion for Modification of the 
Decree of Divorce, conditions had changed. Tfhe plaintiff's 
father had died, who had been a dentist, with) a reputation 
around the community for some material means and a long-term 
illness had exhausted these items. In addition, plaintiff's 
mother was ill and there is now no probability of inheritance, 
although at the time of divorce there had been. Plaintiff's 
health had deteriorated to the point where shfe was now not 
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employable. Defendant had retired and had been drawing 
$15,000.00 to $16,000.00 a year and was retiring on that 
basis from State employment. The exact amount of retirement 
had not been considered. He was now not supporting a 
daughter from a former marriage, which he had been sup-
porting at the time of the divorce on a voluntary basis 
helping her through school and spending approximately 
$150.00 a month on her. That what had been referred to as 
school money was on occasion being used to pay costs of 
the child of the former marriage on a mission at the time 
of the divorce. These items are no longer in existence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING 
TO GRANT ADDITIONAL ALIMONY AND EXTEND ALIMONY 
BEYOND THE $12,000.00 LIMITATION OF THE DECREE. 
This particular action comes under the provisions 
of Title 30, Section 5, Chapter 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended. There is no question this is a discretionary 
item with the trial court. The same judge presided at the 
divorce as at the Petition for Modification. 
-6-
There had been a material change in circumstances. 
At the time of divorce, although a heart patient, plaintiff 
was employable and was living with her parents, was an only 
child and had considerable probability of inheritance. At 
the time of Petition for Modification, plaintiff1s father 
had become deceased after a long terminal illness and exhausted 
the funds of the family, and there was no possibility of 
inheritance. Plaintiff*s mother was ill and to some extent 
plaintiff was caring for her. Plaintiff had become unemployable. 
See the reporter's transcript of the hearing of 22 May, 1973, 
the testimony of R. G. Williams, M. D., beginning at page 2 
through page 7, and specifically page 3, confcnencing at line 
18 to line 30, page 6, shows very definitely a limited 
employment capacity. 
Mr. Stucki was steadily employed. See transcript 
of 22 May, 1973, page 32, line 24, in which the defendant 
testified $13,973.08 and thereafter take homfe pay $750.00 
a month and a pension of $43.40 per month, see page 33, 
line 9, without debts, see page 33, line 27. 
There is no question of material change of cir-
cumstances. See the transcript of the hearing 1 March, 1976, 
which show that the plaintiff is at the later date completely 
unemployable, page 4f line 27, which showed that plaintiff 
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was not to work at all* Other changes in the plaintiff's 
condition are shown on page 4, line 29 through page 5, line 
16. The defendant was on retirement. His V.A. Compensation 
had risen to $57.40 a month, see page 7, line 11, and he had 
not made application for retirement, but was still drawing 
the full amount, although he was at retirement age and had 
taken an early retirement, see page 7, line 21. He had no 
obligations, was no longer paying for a daughter on a mission 
and the entire amount was available to the defendant. The 
trial court took the attitude that the language of the award 
in the Decree cut off any possibility of modification and as 
such abused its discretion, page 3, line 20 of the transcript 
of 1 March, 1976. 
There is no question that this is a discretionary 
item and should have received consideration from the trial 
court due to the material change of circumstances. In 
support of this, one looks at the case of Ridge v. Ridge, 
542 P.2d 189, Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
reiterated in the Ridge case provides for continuing juris-
diction in the courts to make such subsequent orders and 
change of alimony and support payments, which shall be 
reasonable and necessary. 
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There is no question in the instafrt case that a 
modification was reasonable and necessary. Alimony was cut 
off at the $12,000.00 point, which had not been reached at 
the time the Petition for Modification was filed. Thereafter, 
there was a definite showing that at the tirpe of Petition for 
Modification the plaintiff was unemployable? no income, no 
money whatsoever, no possibility of inheritance. At the 
time of divorce, there was a probability of inheritance and 
the plaintiff was partially employable. Defendant1s income 
had increased to $15,000.00 per year and he was in the 
process of retiring. His pension had more than doubled. 
His expenditures that had been being made voluntarily at 
the time of divorce for the benefit of the daughter on a 
mission and in school had been terminated. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in refusing to modify the 
Decree of Divorce and same should be done. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATRICK H. FIENTON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
